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Abstract This paper examines the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI) and education in China, 
through an analysis of government policy and private sector enterprise. While media and policy 
discourse often portray China’s AI development in terms of a unified national strategy, and a 
burgeoning geopolitical contestation for future global dominance, this analysis will suggest a 
more nuanced internal complexity, involving differing regional networks and international 
corporate activity. The first section considers two key policy documents published by the central 
Chinese government, which are shown to implicate educational institutions as influential actors in 
national and regional strategies for AI development, with a significant role in plans to train 
domestic expertise. The second section outlines three prominent private education companies: 
New Oriental Group, Tomorrow Advancing Life (TAL), and Squirrel AI. These companies are 
selected to represent important aspects of China’s development of educational AI applications, 
including the influence of a well-established private education sector, and a growing interest in 
international corporate activity. The paper concludes with the suggestion that while central 
government policy reserves a significant role for education in the national AI strategy, the private 
sector is utilising favourable political conditions to rapidly develop educational applications and 
markets. 
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Introduction – a political economy of AI 
As a result of government endorsement and a thriving entrepreneurial technology sector, 
China’s artificial intelligence (AI) development is attracting considerable international 
attention amongst economists (e.g. Barton et al. 2017; Mubayi et al. 2017), and in particular, 
US-based political analysists (Kempe 2019), security experts (Allen 2019), and military 
advisers (e.g. DIB 2019). As this paper will suggest, educational concerns – related to the 
role of universities in AI research, as well as those of producing data-driven technologies for 
teaching and learning - are now bound up with China’s burgeoning role as an international 
leader in AI development. This paper therefore ‘look[s] beyond the traditional “educational” 
concerns of curriculum and pedagogy, teaching and learning’ (Selwyn 2013, p30), to 
examine the geopolitics of technology development, within which education plays an 
important, and constitutive role. The political economy analysis in this paper is grounded in 
three central and interrelated ideas: firstly, that the relationships between AI and education 
are shaped by an expansive network of actors, rather than simply by technology designers or 
educators; secondly, that these relationships are defined by contestation rather than 
consensus; and thirdly, that AI technologies are developed within already-established 
education and technology contexts, rather than emerging spontaneously.  
 
The central relationship in the networks under examination here is that between governance 
at the national level and the influence of international economic markets. This focuses 
research on ‘the state-approved (and even state-sponsored) liberalisation of educational 
technology markets to widespread global competition’ (Selwyn 2013, p31). Recent research, 
primarily in the context of the US, has examined the way these relationships work to privatise 
the public education sector and infuse the ideals of capitalist commodification and profit into 
increasingly technologized classrooms and lecture halls (see Poritz & Rees 2017; Mirrlees & 
Alvi 2019). In this sense, educational AI can be understood as part of a broader political 
economy of education technology that is foundationally aligned with political orientations, 
and deeply implicated in corporate strategies, focusing attention on issues of production and 
consumption in an educational marketplace. The value of a political economy analysis is 
precisely ‘to make explicit issues of power in society’ (Selwyn 2013, p30), and this paper 
therefore aims to highlight how the development of AI technologies in China are prefigured 
by particular interests in aligning educational policy with geopolitical strategy, and 
incorporating teaching and learning activities into the business models of the tech sector. 
 
Importantly, the relationships between government and private enterprise can be understood 
as manifesting through contestation, with each other as well as within themselves. Chantelle 
Mouffe’s political theory of agonism (2013) provides a helpful way of defining this position. 
Mouffe suggests a distinction between ‘the political’, as a broad space of struggle, conflict, 
and the lack of absolute consensus, and ‘politics’, which takes place within ‘the political’ as 
the attempt to present rational and natural order (2013). This work has been usefully applied 
to the critical study of data-driven technologies by Crawford, who makes a distinction 
between the messy ‘political’ reality of ‘tensions and contests’ between users and designers 
of algorithmic systems, and an instrumentalist ‘politics’ discourse, which tends to portray a 
rational domain of ‘calculation engines, making autocratic decisions between variables’ 
(2016, p79). In other words, data-driven technologies, such as AI, can be understood to 
function in much more complex ways than are often characterised by technical descriptions 
and promotional discourses, which tend to assume stable systems and a straightforward 
consensus about the purpose and functioning of technology in society. As Crawford suggests, 
this dominant view relies on ‘putting the technology in the explanatory driver’s seat’ (2016, 
p89). In contrast, the notion of ‘the political’ here frames a broader, and less rational space, in 
which the roles and intentions of the various actors involved in AI systems - the policy 
makers, technical designers, corporate managers, and end users - come together in conflictual 
relations, involving tensions between differing perspectives and underlying world views. 
Ultimately, it is this ‘political’ that ‘shape[s] public discourse and civic life’ (Crawford 2016, 
p2), rather than the surface reasoning of ‘politics’. As the subsequent analysis will 
demonstrate, this condition of internal conflict - across political and corporate domains, as 
well as within them - suggests a much more critical and nuanced view of the development of 
AI in China than is often portrayed in public discourse elsewhere.  
 
Another important dimension of deepening our understanding of AI and education in China is 
to examine the existing contexts within which the policies and corporate educational 
practices related to these technologies are situated. As Selwyn suggests, a political economy 
analysis is sensitive to the ‘the continuities and the discontinuities between old and new 
forms of technology use in education’ (2013, p32, emphasis original), and it is imperative in 
the context of this paper to look beyond the general discourses of ‘innovation’ and 
‘disruption’ that tend to accompany the promotion of AI in order to assess how the 
contemporary landscape in China corresponds to older and already-established education and 
technology activity. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive history 
of both science and technology development and educational practices in China, however 
across the subsequent analysis sections, some key examples of contexts relating to 
government strategy and private education will be included. 
 
The Chinese context 
This paper seeks to understand what makes the context of Chinese educational AI 
development distinct from those of elsewhere, and it is precisely in the political and 
economic orders that these idiosyncrasies are most apparent, rather than necessarily in the 
design and development of the technologies themselves, which largely reflect the direction of 
research internationally. Indeed, it is the examples of rapid development and scaled 
deployment of Chinese educational AI – features, it will be argued, of the political context – 
that have attracted international attention (for example Hao 2019), rather than necessarily the 
novelty of the technical functions, such as speech or facial recognition, which are well-
established areas of AI research elsewhere. It is for this reason that the paper focuses on the 
relationships between government policy and commercial education technology development 
in order to suggest some of the foundations upon which specific educational AI systems are 
being designed and used in China.  
 
Furthermore, the kind of political economy analysis described above offers additional value 
as a way of countering some of the common-place assumptions that tend to accompany 
commentary on technology developed in China. The Chinese context for educational AI 
development is better understood, not as an isolated national endeavour, but one that is 
inextricably connected to international activity, thus requiring perspectives that acknowledge 
the involvement of multiple actors. As Ding and Costigan suggest, ‘national AI capability is 
such a fuzzy concept’ (2019, p27), yet this tends to be the way the Chinese context is 
represented across a range of policy and media discourse. Central to this portrayal has been 
the notion of an ‘AI arms race’ (Borowska 2019), in which an ascendant China is now 
threatening a previously dominant US. Exemplifying this narrative, Kempe1 suggests China 
is ‘on track to take the commanding heights of AI’ in which ‘the consequences could be 
historic in nature’, for the reason that ‘[c]ountries that are most innovative and 
technologically advanced tend to dominate international relations’ (Kempe 2019). 
Contemporary geopolitics therefore appears to be increasingly articulated through assumed 
national capacities for AI development, in which ‘China’s prowess in the field will help 
fortify its position as the dominant economic power in the world’ (Knight 2017). Others 
suggest that the apparent threat from Chinese AI development requires the US to regain their 
                                                
1	CEO	of	US	think	tank	the	Atlantic	Council	
dominance through global regulation (Prakash 2018)2. In a somewhat bizarre twist in these 
geopolitical contestations, a research team from China recently published details of an AI 
system capable of making predictions about global events, and offering automated 
suggestions for foreign policy decisions (see Zhang et al. 2018). Here, not only is China’s AI 
development seen as a danger to geopolitical stability, but it’s supposed capacity to employ 
these very same data science techniques to enhance its foreign policy power suggests, for 
some, an additionally ominous form of future politics (Prakash 2019a). 
 
Alongside policy discourse, recent years have also seen a tendency for ‘China bashing’ (Qiu 
2016, p7), or indeed a ‘scary China’ (Yang 2019) narrative in the media, specifically related 
to the development of Chinese technologies. Inclinations to interpret Chinese technology 
development in terms of Western dystopic fictions (see Jefferson 2018) amplify the sense of 
a fundamental difference to the Chinese context, and a threatening agenda to the production 
of AI. Much of this media discourse is underpinned by long-standing cultural assumptions 
about the unified and homogeneous character of China’s population, who are supposedly 
‘obsessed with education’ (Chu 2013, p5). This uncritical and entrenched view of ‘the 
Chinese as a giant, homogeneous, mass of humanity’ (Chu 2013, p13) directly shapes media 
representations, which tend to portray educational AI developed in China as ‘a grand 
experiment’ (Hao 2019), rather than very specific initiatives located in particular regions, 
cities, or schools. It is therefore the internal complexities and contradictions that need to be 
surfaced, as a way of countering the common-place ‘myth’ that ‘China’s approach to AI is 
defined by its top-down and monolithic nature’ (Ding 2018, p3). 
 
AI Policy in China 
In 2017, the Chinese government published the State Council’s National Strategy for AI 
Development3, and it is the release of this policy document, perhaps more than any other 
single event in recent years, which has garnered international attention around the 
development of technology in China, and encouraged the idea of a grand national strategy for 
global AI dominance. The document frequently appears in media reporting as a foundational 
moment in China’s AI development (e.g. Knight 2017; Thompson 2018), and is the subject of 
numerous policy analyses (e.g. Ding 2018; Webster et al. 2017; Lee & Triolo 2017), with a 
predominant focus on the geopolitical and economic significance of the technology. The 
often-quoted schedule within the policy includes the aim, by 2030, of establishing China as 
the principal international centre for innovation, ‘with a core AI industry gross output 
exceeding RMB 1 trillion’ (Ding 2018, p10). Worked through the policy is also an 
underlying aspiration to become self-sufficient in the production of AI by reducing 
dependencies on both foreign technologies and overseas expertise (Allen 2019).  
 
Much less attention has been given to the role of education within Chinese AI policy, as well 
as the potential impact of government strategy on educational institutions and activities. This 
                                                
2 Prakash suggests global regulation of ‘AI trade, overseen by the US: ‘the U.S. should create the world’s first “AI Trade Organization” or 
AITO. Just like in the 20th century, when the U.S. created the World Trade Organization (WTO) to govern traditional trade, AITO would 
govern AI trade.’ (Prakash 2019b) 
3	Sometimes	translated	as	‘New	Generation	Artificial	Intelligence	Development	Plan’	
is despite specific references to the foundational role of higher education within the State 
Council’s National Strategy for AI Development, which outline ‘a long-term view to growing 
AI talent through constructing an AI academic discipline and creating pilot AI institutes’ 
(Ding 2018, p5). In other words, the ambitions of China’s AI development appear conditional 
on a higher education system tuned towards the production of specific AI expertise. Indeed, 
the particular significance of higher education to China’s AI strategy is evidenced by a 
second policy document, released the following year in 2018: the Action Plan for Artificial 
Intelligence Innovation in Colleges and Universities. This policy aims to: 
 
accelerate the innovation and application of artificial intelligence in the field 
of education, use intelligent technology to support the innovation of talent 
training model, the reform of teaching methods, and the improvement of 
educational governance capabilities, and build an intelligent, networked, 
personalized and lifelong education system. (MEPRC 2018) 
 
In order to achieve this grand vision, the policy provides three core objectives, concerned 
with: establishing university infrastructures and curricula capable of adapting to AI, by a 
target date of 2020; enhancing research and development, as well as the workforce training in 
specific skills related to AI, by a target date of 2025; and finally, Chinese universities 
becoming global leaders in AI innovation, by a target date of 2030 (MEPRC 2018). This 
central role for educational institutions seems particularly important to highlight in the 
development of AI, given the more typical interest in private sector ‘disruption’ and 
technology entrepreneurialism. The policy outlines plans to build ‘colleges and universities 
into an important source of global artificial intelligence technology innovation’ (MEPRC 
2018). Further detail is provided regarding the role of such institutions, which will ‘further 
strengthen the advantages of basic research, discipline development and personnel training’ 
(MEPRC 2018). Universities therefore appear to be identified as essential sites, not only for 
research and development, but also for establishing new educational programmes and 
qualifications that can produce the kind of expertise and workforce required for an AI-infused 
future economy. This is made more explicit in a section on ‘Improv[ing] the personnel 
training system in the field of artificial intelligence’ (MEPRC 2018), which identifies a 
number of objectives, including course and curricula development, industry engagement, 
entrepreneurship, and international exchange linked to the much-publicised ‘Belt and Road’ 
infrastructure project4. This ‘deep integration of artificial intelligence and education’ 
(MEPRC 2018) therefore appears grounded in the notion of training new generations of AI 
experts.  
 
Particularly notable is the aim of developing AI as a core disciplinary subject, along with the 
establishment of ‘first-discipline’ examples at specific universities; a formal identification of 
the best degree programme in a given subject in China. This can be seen as a response to calls 
from a number of professors in China to consolidate AI teaching, which is often seen as 




‘scattered’ amongst other more established disciplines, such as computer science and 
statistics (see Xu et al. 2018). Chinese universities appear to be responding accordingly, with 
reports of more than 50 institutions setting up new degree programmes in AI-related subjects 
(see Xu et al. 2018). The policy also includes the aim of developing interdisciplinary 
qualifications, termed ‘AI + X’, identifying the need for combined degrees through which AI 
is taught as an applied subject, with specific relevance to ‘mathematics, computer science, 
physics, biology, psychology, sociology, law and other disciplines’ (MEPRC 2018). Further, 
the policy suggests a ‘universal education’ for AI, incorporating formal and informal training 
opportunities, appearing to leave little, at least in terms of adult education, untouched by 
technological reform. 
 
While the State Council’s National Strategy for AI Development and the Action Plan for 
Artificial Intelligence Innovation in Colleges and Universities are rather explicit in their aims 
of aligning higher education with political aspirations for AI supremacy, the educational 
features of these policies should also be understood in terms of the desire for self-sufficiency 
within the broader geopolitical contestations of technology development (see Allen 2019; 
Laskai and Toner 2019). A nationalist outlook frames much of the Colleges and Universities 
policy, which calls for AI development to ‘build a strong country of education, a strong 
country of science and technology, and a smart society’ (MEPRC 2018), with a key part of 
this vision being the training of domestic expertise. A recent influential report from the 
Chinese Institute for Science and Technology Policy (CISTP 2018) indicates some of the 
motivations behind this drive to train native AI capabilities: the paper offers a methodology 
for ranking both international ‘AI talent’, and a higher-level ‘top AI talent’, and highlights 
some assumed deficiencies in the latter category where China is concerned – ranking only 6th 
globally (CISTP 2018). Presumably intensifying government concerns over this shortage in 
expertise is the substantial number of Chinese nationals who study AI-related subjects 
abroad, and who often subsequently gain employment in prestigious development teams 
outside of China, mainly in the US (Sheehan and Ma 2019). The response from the Chinese 
government has been to endorse a range of ‘[n]ational-level and local-level “talent 
programs”’ which are ‘gathering AI researchers to work in China’ (Ding 2018, p5). For 
example, the ‘Ten Thousand Talents’ scheme appears specifically directed towards attracting 
AI scholars working abroad to return to research and development positions in China, with 
significant financial incentives (Ding 2018). While the talent schemes are considered to have 
had mixed success (Ding 2018), these efforts signal the importance placed, not just on the 
research capacity of higher education as a key site for AI development, but also on the 
potential to train future personnel5. Zhou Ming, deputy director of the Education and 
Examination Centre under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, was 
recently quoted as suggesting that China faced ‘an AI talent shortage of more than 5 million’ 
(see Li 2018). Such estimations place workforce training centre stage in China’s ambitions 
for AI. Furthermore, these contestations and desires for AI expertise reveal what may be one 
of the central and underlying objectives of Chinese government policy: to shift the 
                                                
5 This strategy is not limited to the public sector, with China’s tech giants setting up ‘their own overseas AI institutes to recruit foreign 
talent’ (Ding 2018, p5). Thus ‘both Chinese government actors and commercial players are aggressively building up and recruiting AI talent 
from around the world’ (Sheehan & Ma 2019). 
geographical location of university AI power, away from elite US institutions towards those 
in China. The establishment of internationally-leading AI schools, can therefore be 
understood as a central feature of broader geopolitical rivalry, in which reputation and 
innovation in the production of AI technologies is seen as indispensable to future economic 
prosperity, and ultimately, global dominance. 
 
While there is clearly a much more complex picture behind these policy aims, involving 
international networks and trajectories through which AI expertise is produced and exploited, 
there is also an internal complexity to China’s AI governance that requires attention. Recent 
research identified 845 provincial-level policy documents relating to AI development, 
produced ‘in the light of local conditions to steer local AI industry deployments’ (CISTP 
2018, p78). This suggests a much more nuanced policy landscape compared to the national 
vision described previously, and in particular, a varied approach: Jiangsu province boasts the 
greatest number of AI policies at 73, while Heilongjiang province has the least, at just 6 
(CISTP 2018, p79). Significantly, the research also links high numbers of local policies with 
the emergence of ‘three core regions’ (CISTP 2018, p80), specifically those around Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou, which vastly outpace other areas in AI development activity, but 
are also distinguished by their own existing networks. For example, the Beijing region 
includes ‘many state-level scientific research institutions, numerous research institutes and 
many innovative industrial parks’ (CISTP 2018, p80). The development and implementation 
of AI in China therefore needs to be understood in the context of these vastly different 
regional capacities. As Lehmann argues, city-level politics further define China’s 
development of AI, with the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence (BAAI) emerging as 
a leading group: 
 
formed from a coalition of academic and private sector leaders, with backing 
from some of Beijing’s most influential institutions and corporations in AI, 
including Peking University, Tsinghua University, the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, Baidu, ByteDance, Megvii, Meituan-Dianping, and Xiaomi. 
(Lehmann 2019, p21) 
 
This demonstrates the way high-level national policy is being implemented by local 
combinations of government, higher education institutions, and the private sector. Therefore, 
rather than straightforward, top-down governance, China’s AI development can be seen as 
arising from ‘bureaucratic agencies, private companies, academic labs, and subnational 
governments [that] are all pursuing their own interests to stake out their claims to China’s AI 
dream’ (2018, p3), portraying a much more contested domain. While the next section turns 
specifically to an exploration of the private sector, and its substantial and distinctive role in 
Chinese AI development, the BAAI example suggests an acutely central role for universities 
in this arrangement. A key example is the BAAI’s response to recruiting AI talent, which has 
been implemented in Beijing through the ‘Zhiyuan Scholars’6 programme. As Lehmann 
                                                
6	An	initiative	by	BAAI	to	recruit	100	AI	experts	per	year	for	three	years,	see:	http://bjrb.bjd.com.cn/html/2019-
04/18/content_11878962.htm	
notes, of the 65 experts recruited, [o]nly four currently work in the private sector, while all 
others are professors, researchers, and leaders of academic and research institutions’ 
(Lehmann 2019, p23). For Lehmann, the work of the BAAI ‘is an example of the Chinese 
bureaucracy’s recurring pattern of top-down directives and bottom-up execution’ (2019, 
p24), and indicates a potentially significant level of power and agency for universities in 
directing the development of AI research.   
 
Furthermore, a surface reading of China’s AI policies overlooks important historical 
dimensions to both Chinese education and science and technology developments. The State 
Council AI policy should be understood within the context of a much broader science and 
technology strategy (Ding 2018), which has been inextricably linked to China’s politics and 
governance since the early 20th century (Qiu 2017). As Wang (2018) shows, while AI 
research specifically did not emerge in earnest in China until the 1980s, its development has 
consistently been influenced by political ideology – through Soviet cybernetics in the 1950s, 
the split with Russia in the 1960s, and the eventual resurgence of science and technology 
after the end of cultural revolution in the late 1970s. As such, it is important to view China’s 
AI development as persistently influenced by ‘political ideologies and struggles, diplomatic 
relations, and [the] economy’ (Wang 2018). The policies discussed previously therefore 
represent a deep-seated continuity of interest in employing, and shaping, science and 
technology, and specifically AI, for political ends. Moreover, the history of educational 
reform in China has been closely aligned with the politics of science and technology 
development (Yu et al. 2012)7. The resurgence of science and technology after the cultural 
revolution, and the very beginnings of Chinese AI research, resulted from the broad market-
economy reforms of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平), which were accompanied with the immediate 
transformation of higher education. In a speech at the National Conference on Education, 
right at the end of the cultural revolution in 1978, Deng announces that ‘education must meet 
the requirements of our country’s economic development’ (Schell and Shambaugh 1999, 
p220), signalling an alignment with the ‘market-based economic and policy mechanisms’ 
(Yu et al. 2012, p15) that have characterised China’s governance until the present day. 
Indeed, it is this broader economic transformation – for some, ‘the most spectacular in 
history’ (see Chu 2013, p5) - that has led to a powerful and prosperous private sector, and a 
substantial number of companies pursuing the development of AI specifically for use in 
educational settings.  
 
Corporate Educational AI 
In contrast to the idea that China’s government are seeking to centralise control of AI 
development for purely political ends, Lee (2018) characterises Chinese AI policy, as 
discussed in the previous section, as a broad endorsement, and a deliberate avoidance of 
regulation, in order to encourage the flourishing of the private sector. While, as will be 






elaborated, the relationship between central governance and commercial activity is not quite 
as seamless as Lee (2018) implies, AI companies in China have certainly attracted 
international attention for their rapid development of products. One example is SenseTime 
(商汤科技, or Shang Tang Technology), a company specialising in facial recognition, which 
has been suggested to be China’s largest unicorn8 (Shu-Ching 2018), and the world’s most 
valuable AI start-up (Vincent 2018). However, within this clearly thriving area, the 
development of specifically educational AI can be understood as occupying a special place 
amongst the entrepreneurial cultures of China’s technology sector. As Hao (2019) suggests, 
start-ups working on education projects in particular receive tax-breaks from the government, 
and are generally seen as safe options for investors. This section outlies three prominent 
Chinese private education companies that appear to have taken advantage of this context to 
develop AI for use in educational settings: New Oriental Group, Tomorrow Advancing Life 
(TAL), and Squirrel AI. This is by no means an exhaustive or definitive account of the 
private sector, however the three organisations discussed below represent an important way 
of understanding the origins and trajectory of educational AI development in China: the 
growth of data-driven technologies from established extra-curricular educational provision; 
the fast-paced development of ostensibly sophisticated products and the expansion of 
substantial educational markets; and an increasingly international outlook. 
 
New Oriental Group 
The New Oriental Education and Technology Group is the largest private education company 
in China. Their renown in China is perhaps signified by the 2013 film American Dreams in 
China (中国合伙人 – translated literally as 'Chinese business partners'), which depicted the 
origins of the company as a provider of English language teaching9. Founded in 1993, the 
company boasts 89 schools, 1,125 learning centres, over 30,100 teachers, and 18 bookstores 
(NOETG 2015a). Alongside English language teaching, the New Oriental Group also focus 
on preparation for the Graduate Record Examinations (GRE) for admission to US graduate 
schools, as well as a focus on domestic extra-curricular exam preparation, such as the Gaokao 
(高考) Chinese college entrance exam. The size of the company demonstrates the high 
demand for such extra-curricular provision in China, where the education system is seen as 
highly competitive (Yu et al. 2012). The New Oriental Group are headquartered in the 
Haidian district of Beijing, which is the location of many of the country’s best known 
technology firms, as well as China’s two elite universities: Peking University and Tsinghua 
University. The company have long been embedded in this local network of tech start-ups, 
entrepreneurs, investors, and highly-qualified graduates. The company provide online 
education through their ‘Koolearn’ (新东方在线) platform, comprised of over 2000 courses 
(NOETG 2015a). Claiming to have had 40.5 million student enrolments across their services 
(NOETG 2015a), the company presumably have access to considerable volumes of data. 
Recent news of the development of AI projects is therefore highly significant. Two related 
projects were announced in October 2018: a strategic initiative called ‘N-Brain’ aimed at 




‘building cooperation among AI-related institutions, investors and businesses’, and an 
application aimed at applying this work directly in teaching activity, named ‘AI Class 
Director10’ (Xu 2018). The N-Brain initiative is indicative of the particular kind of 
collaborations and networks through which educational AI is being developed in China, 
involving a partnership with the University of Illinois in the US to establish research labs, as 
well as an investment deal with GSV Capital (Xu 2018), a Silicon Valley venture capital firm 
who list Coursera, CourseHero, Spotify, Palantir, and Dropbox in their ‘top 10 
investments11’. This suggests a much more international orientation to AI development than 
the nationalistic framing in government policy, and a highly-corporatized mode of operation - 
detailed information for potential investors appears prominently on the New Oriental Group 
website (NOETG 2015b). 
 
While clearly in a development phase, the ‘AI Class Director’ appears to promise typically 
extensive features, presumably enabled by the large volumes of data this company has access 
to, involving: 
face and speech recognition, facial attributes analysis, natural language 
processing and other AI tech to track each student's class performance in real 
time, analyze their emotions, participation and results in a quantitative approach, 
giving advice accordingly (Qiao Lei quoted in Xu 2018) 
However, despite the broad scope of technical aspects suggested here, a specific focus on 
English language is emphasised in the suggestion that the system can: 
 
grade and correct a child's pronunciation and generate personalized learning 
reports based on data, enabling the AI to understand Chinese students' English 
learning and improve the experience and outcome’ (Xu 2018).  
 
This suggests that the ‘AI Class Director’ specialises, perhaps unsurprisingly, in the New 
Oriental Group’s core and original business of English language education. The ‘AI Class 
Director’ system is being developed by BlingABC12, a subsidiary of the New Oriental Group 
which has developed an online platform for pairing primary school children with teachers 
from English-speaking countries (the Chief Executive of which is Qiao Lei quoted above). 
While it is not clear precisely what data is being used to train this feature of the ‘AI Class 
Director’, the BlingABC platform functions by linking children with English teachers 
through live video feeds, presumably generating considerable volumes of voice recordings. 
Additionally significant here is the way in which New Oriental Group’s development of AI 
derives directly from its business of extra-curricular educational provision, which has been 
aimed at students of higher socio-economic status in China. Specifically, this population of 
students includes those interested in learning English for some form of international activity, 
as well as those aiming to achieve high scores in the Chinese college entrance exam, and thus 




a place in the higher tier universities13. This means, not only that the data underpinning 
projects such as the ‘AI Class Director’ derive from the activity and behaviour of particular, 
and often privileged, Chinese student populations, but also that this development of 
educational AI is oriented towards selective, and somewhat elite, educational pathways. 
 
Tomorrow Advancing Life (TAL) 
Founded in 2003, and also headquartered in the Haidian district of Beijing, Tomorrow 
Advancing Life (TAL) has also emerged as a significant developer of educational AI. It is 
important to note that TAL is the English name of the company, launched in 2013, and not a 
direct translation from the Chinese好未来, or Hao Wei Lai, meaning ‘Good Future’14. This 
change in the company name indicates a growing interest in international recognition. The 
company was listed on the New York stock exchange in 2010, and has also matured into an 
investor in other educational initiatives, notably the San Francisco-based online education 
provider Minerva in 2014, and the New York-based education technology company Knewton 
in 2016. The company presents itself as an overtly corporate entity15, detailing information 
for both ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘investors’ prominently on its website16. This demonstrates the 
increasing involvement in global education technology markets, and growing power, of 
Chinese education technology companies. Significantly, part of the strategic investment in 
Knewton involved TAL acquiring so-called ‘adaptive’ technology (Vinton 2016), for which 
the US company have become well-known. This suggests relationships of exchange rather 
than competition between US and Chinese companies, through which the technical features 
of educational AI are traded, reused, and adapted. TAL are also networked with academic 
partners, for example through a recently-announced collaboration with Tsinghua University 
to establish an AI research centre (see Zhang 2017).  
 
TAL advertise a large number of ‘sub-brands’, projects, and applications, appearing to 
demonstrate extensive deployment of educational AI-related products. Through a dedicated 
‘AI Lab’, the company describe the application of ‘visual, voice, natural language processing 
and machine learning to assist students in teaching, inspiring students' classroom interest and 
intelligent interaction’ (TAL 2017b). One well-publicised system developed through the TAL 
AI lab is the ‘Mo Jing’ (魔镜), or ‘magic mirror’ system, which claims to incorporate an 
extensive range of technologies, including facial recognition. A recent report described the 
system in the following terms:  
Through the combination of software and hardware, the classroom has eyes 
(camera), ears (microphone), brain (the cloud) and other organs (iPad), so that the 
teaching process becomes quantified’ (People’s Daily 2018) 









As with the New Oriental Group, TAL have extensive experience in scaled educational 
provision, from which they presumably have access to substantial archives of data with 
which to ground their AI development. For example, Zhang Guohui, head of TAL’s Xue Er 
Si (学而思) Online School recently reported more than 7 million students registered on their 
platform, and from which they have ‘accumulated around 10,000 hours of voice samples in 
the past year’ (Cheng 2018). TAL also promote an ‘Intelligent Teaching System’, ‘Intelligent 
Practice System’, and ‘Personalised Learning System’ as products that specifically draw on 
educational ‘big data’ (TAL 2017b). These products appear to be particularly directed 
towards extra-curricular coaching and support for school-related subjects, English language 
teaching, and ‘study abroad’ training, reflecting the emphasis of the New Oriental Group 
discussed previously. TAL’s extensive development of educational AI is therefore also 
underpinned by data collected from very specific populations of learners, and focused on 
providing technologies to support fairly privileged educational pathways within the broad 
spectrum of the Chinese education system. Furthermore, in a similar way to the New Oriental 
Group, TAL’s development if educational AI appears to be driven by a desire to cultivate 
markets within a lively private education sector, with a high demand for extra-curricular 
provision. 
 
However, what distinguishes TAL from the New Oriental Group is a more extensive 
commitment to developing educational AI, for which the company have recently been 
selected by the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology to represent the area of ‘smart 
education’ in the ‘National New Generation Artificial Intelligence Open Innovation Platform’ 
(AIOIP), or ‘National AI team’ (see Larsen 2019). As such, TAL are expected to ‘promote 
deep integration of AI with the real economy’ (Larsen 2019, p17), and support the 
entrepreneurial development of other small and medium-sized companies, through the 
establishment of business networks and the sharing of data and software. As Larsen suggests, 
the structure of the ‘National AI team’ constitutes:  
 
a new model of AI development … where government-designated platforms 
and related public-private partnerships emphasize an experimental, gradual, 
and decentralized approach to selectively opening public domains and 
associated data repositories’ (Larsen 2019, p17).  
 
TAL therefore appear to be in a powerful position with respect to defining how private 
educational companies in China will be able to develop further relationships with the 
mainstream education system. As Larsen further explains,  
 
leading private sector enterprises are endorsed to apply innovative AI 
solutions to optimize public institutions and the provision of public goods and 
services, often implemented on a local and regional basis. (Larsen 2019, p17)  
 
This provides some insight into how the relationship between central government policy and 
private enterprise is being envisioned in China, suggesting substantial agency for regional 
networks, but also significant influence for commercial organisations. For the development of 
educational AI, TAL would appear to be in a leading role, with the endorsement to not only 
acquire and manage public educational data, but also to define the future development of the 
sector. However, while members of the ‘National AI team’ are ‘the de facto architects of 
system-wide standards and interfaces’, these are also ‘shaped in collaboration with research 
institutes, universities, and policymakers’ (Larsen 2019, p18). Such corporate influence, 
therefore, while substantial, should be understood as existing within networks of different 
regional actors, involving potentially conflicting aims. 
 
YiXue (Squirrel AI) 
One key example of a newer educational AI company is YiXue Education (乂学教育), who 
are behind the prominent ‘Squirrel AI’. Despite being founded in Shanghai in 2014, Squirrel 
AI already claims ‘over 1700 schools’, and ‘3,000 teaching staff in more than 200 cities 
across more than 20 provinces and autonomous regions in China’ (YiXue n.d. b). Notably, 
while operating within the specific networks of the Shanghai region, Squirrel AI lists TAL 
and the New Oriental Group as funders (see Cheng 2018). Distinguishing Squirrel AI from 
the previous two companies discussed here is the more direct and unambiguous cultivation of 
an international reputation (Hao 2019), as well as the focus on developing and promoting a 
single educational AI application. Squirrel AI recently announced the recruitment of Tom 
Mitchell, E. Fredkin University Professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and general 
machine learning luminary, as their Chief AI Officer (YiXue n.d. a). Other team members 
include Richard Tong, formerly of US-based Knewton, and Dan Bindman, formerly of the 
educational AI software Assessment and Learning in Knowledge Spaces (ALEKS), 
developed at the University of California Irvine. Squirrel AI have also publicised the 
collaborative development of AI research centres with the Chinese Academy of Science, and 
the American research institute SRI international (founded by Stanford University), as well as 
‘major’ research partnerships with Carnegie Mellon University and University of California 
Berkeley (YiXue n.d. b), and further collaborations with MIT and Harvard (Hao 2019). This 
constitutes a more overt attempt to position Squirrel AI as a prominent international 
educational AI enterprise, rather than necessarily as a purely Chinese entity. As Hao 
suggests, Squirrel AI is ‘one of the best-poised [educational AI companies] to spread 
overseas’ (Hao 2019). 
 
Alongside the cultivation of corporate and academic partners in the US, Squirrel AI brands 
itself around a single educational application, rather than a suite of technologies: an adaptive 
learning system that gathers fine-grained data about individual students’ abilities in order to 
calculate personalised pathways through course curricula. While the technology currently 
appears to be driven largely by a ‘question pushing system’ in order to gather precise data 
about student progress, co-founder Wei Cui suggested in a recent report that: 
real-time heart rate, brain wave and facial expression recognition during learning 
will be added for comprehensive analysis. Each student will be equipped with a 
virtual personal assistant to provide better learning services for them (Cui quoted 
in Squirrel AI Learning 2019) 
Despite this promise of a technically sophisticated system combining a complex range of 
features, the focus on so-called ‘adaptive learning’ in educational AI reflects the development 
of data-driven technologies elsewhere, and appears to demonstrate the influence of their 
recently recruited US-based team members. Nevertheless, Squirrel AI’s business firmly 
reflects that of the New Oriental Group and TAL discussed previously, providing extra-
curricular private education to select populations of students in China. Moreover, Squirrel 
AI’s product should also be understood in terms of the Chinese educational context into 
which it is being developed and deployed (see Hao 2019); one grounded in standardisation 
and competition. The AI system, including the promise of a ‘virtual personal assistant’ 
described above, is undoubtedly oriented towards highly standardised curricula, and very 
specific learning routines, such as exam preparation. Moreover, it is an application that 
appears to be developed specifically to respond to the desire for private extra-curricular 
education in China, and the cultivation of a marketplace for an educational product, much 
more so that any underlying pedagogical justification. While Squirrel AI have ambitions to 
spread their business into mainstream schools in China (see Hao 2019), their products also 
appear likely to appeal to national education systems elsewhere, particularly those placing a 
high value on standardisation and testing. 
 
What is perhaps most significant across the three companies outlined in this section is the 
opportune use of central government endorsement to rapidly develop AI applications and 
aggressively pursue educational markets, competing within and across regions. It is this 
pursuit of marketable products that appears to define the general approach of the private 




Ultimately, it is tensions between state-led and market-driven approaches, rather than 
simplistic notions of a uniform nationalistic strategy, that characterise AI development in 
China (Nelson 2019). As this paper has described, these tensions also define and shape the 
educational landscape. As the discussion of policy has revealed, amongst the broad strategy 
for national AI development, educational institutions are envisioned as key actors, both in the 
sense of leading research and development, as well as training the new generations of 
technical experts required to maintain a technology-driven economy. In practice, AI 
development appears to be taking place through specific regional networks involving local 
governments, educational institutions, and private sector companies. Rather than perceiving 
the relationships between government and education as novel, AI policy should also be 
understood within the context of the recent history of science and technology development in 
China, which has maintained a vision of close educational support for political endeavours. 
However, contemporary national policy has also produced conditions in which private sector 
enterprise has gained considerable influence and agency within regional development 
networks. Private education companies have further utilised favourable political conditions to 
develop and expand ways of applying AI technologies to their particular areas of extra-
curricular provision. This appears to have produced ostensibly sophisticated AI applications 
that are largely underpinned by the desire to develop educational markets, rather than 
implement any particular or explicit pedagogical rationale. Education in China is therefore 
experiencing the effects of AI development on two fronts: from central and regional 
governments, interested in engineering educational institutions towards strategic AI research 
and training; and from an increasingly influential corporate sector, developing AI 
applications with the potential to intensify an already standardised and competitive system, 
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